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NOTES
JUSTICE RUTLEDGE AND STATE TAXATION
OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE*
When the late Wiley Blount Rutledge was elevated to the
Supreme Court in 1943, an erstwhile law school associate' pre-
dicted that the former law school dean 2 would bring to the high
court a refreshing clarity of thought and expression.
Justice Rutledge did just that in giving new judicial interpre-
tation to the age-old problem of state taxation of interstate com-
merce.
However voluminous the "essays" he penned and however close
they bordered on judicial legislating, the decisions of the late
justice were distinguished for a consistency and boldness of
approach 3 that too often was lacking on the part of the full court
during the past decade.
Projected onto the national scene during a period marked by
repeated changes of court personnel and almost as many changes
in court philosophy, Justice Rutledge found constant need for
all the judicial art that had been ascribed to him: "The careful
analysis of facts, the appreciation of the interests at stake, the
identification of the legal issues involved, the attention to the
purposes underlying the law, and, finally, the decision in terms
of the ends to be served."4
These are the essentials of the judicial art of a scholar, and
they were the modus operandi of the court's severest critic dur-
ing his six years on the high court. Justice Rutledge's primary
thesis was that consequences, not captions, should be determina-
tive of the constitutionality of any piece of legislation. This was
* This paper was written as part of the requirements for the course in
Public Finance.
1. Fuchs, The Judicial Art of Wiley E. Rutledge, 28 WAsH. U. L. Q. 115
(1943).
2. Justice Rutledge was Associate Professor of Law at the University of
Colorado from 1924 to 1926, successively Professor of Law and Dean at
Washington University from 1926 to 1935, and Dean at the State University
of Iowa from 1935 to 1939. He served as a member of the United States
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia from May 2, 1939, to February
15, 1943, the date of his induction to the Supreme Court.
3. In paying tribute to his late colleague on the Circuit Court of Appeals,
Justice Henry W. Edgerton wrote: "It was Brandeis who said: 'If we would
guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.'.. . Few judges
in our time have done this so notably as Rutledge. In boldness and imagina-
tion, in sense and defense of democracy, he was in the great tradition."
Edgerton, Mr. Justice Rutledge, 63 HARV. L. REV. 293, 296 (1949).
4. Fuchs, supra note 1 at 146.
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particularly important, he believed, in the field of state taxation
of interstate commerce.
The use, he declared, of such terms of art as "direct" taxes,
"indirect" taxes and "local incidents" was not only unrealistic
but a hopelessly inaccurate attempt to draw the protecting line
around interstate commerce envisaged by Article I, Section 8, of
the Constitution.
Not 'directness' or 'immediacy' of incidence per se, whether
'upon the commerce itself' or upon a 'local incident' is the
outlawing factor, but whether the tax, regardless of the
special point of incidence, has the consequences for inter-
state trade intended to be outlawed by the Commerce Clause.0
The Constitution had said simply:
Congress shall have the power.., to regulate commerce...
among the several states.0
From 18737 to 19388 the court had held that states could not
lay a direct tax on interstate commerce. A newly liberalized
court in the latter year had relaxed the rigidity of the "no direct
tax" ban, but only where no cumulative burden was present or
potential. This new bloc within the court, headed by the late
Justice Stone and initially numbering among its disciples Jus-
tices Frankfurter, Black and Douglas, applied a mechanical test.
When satisfied as to due process requirements, it asked a single
question: Does it offer a present or potential cumulative burden?
If the answer was affirmative, the tax automatically fell., If the
answer was negative, the tax was upheld.10 Thus judicial bless-
ing was given to a new form of direct taxation." But the dispen-
sation was short lived. In McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal
5. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 268 (1946).
6. U. S. CONST. Art. I, §8, cl. 3.
7. In the case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall 232 (1873), the court
held invalid a tax on interstate shipments because "the transportation of
passengers or merchandise ... from one state to another" is in its nature
"national" and admit of "one uniform system or plan of regulation."
8. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938) (Inter-
state Commerce clause cannot relieve those engaged in interstate commerce
from just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of
doing the business).
9. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938); Gwin, White &
Prince Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
10. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
11. Justice Rutledge contended that the following taxes, sustained because
they were apportioned, were non the less "direct" taxs: Capital stock tax-
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 450 (1891); net in-
come-Illinois Central Railroad v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450 (1918); gross
receipts-Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1947).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss3/5
NOTES
Co. 12 in 1940 the court disavowed its approval of any direct tax.
But by segmenting the act of delivery from what theretofore had
been one complete interstate transaction, the court upheld a state
of market sales tax while refusing to call it a levy on interstate
commerce.
It was this puzzling play on words which served as prelude
for Justice Rutledge's appointment to the Supreme Court in
1943. He took the court at face value when it held in the Ber-
wind-White case that a state of market could-tax an interstate
transaction. He regretted the reasoning employed to reach that
decision but found the result altogether to the liking of his prac-
tical mind.
He was not prepared, therefore, to accept without a polite
rebuke to his colleagues the majority decision in McLeod v. Dil-
worth, 1 where, under somewhat comparable facts, the court in-
validated a state of market tax levied by Arkansas. The majority
reasoned there that since "title passed" to the goods in Tennessee,
the imposition of a tax by Arkansas was an extraterritorial pro-
jection of its powers, which due process denied. The Berwind-
White case was distinguished on the ground that a sales office
was maintained in New York, whereas there were only solicitors
in Arkansas, and there was a "transfer of possession" in New
York, while there was none in Arkansas.
McLeod v. Dilworth was one of a trilogy decided January 6,
1944, and a single opinion in which he dissented to the Arkansas
sales tax decision and concurred in the other two' 4 gave the
freshman justice his first opportunity to espouse judicially a
state of market tax philosophy, which, like his apportioned direct
tax theory, was to distinguish his brief term on the upper court.
It also was the occasion for the first of his numerous blasts at
the court's "eternal search for a taxable incident" on which to
"hang constitutionality under due process ideas."
As Justice Rutldege saw it, the majority opinion was an unsus-
tainable due process decision, not an answer to the only question
he found involved: Does it violate the Commerce Clause? Both
states, said Justice Rutledge, had factual connections sufficient
12. 309 U.S. 388 (1940).
13. 322 U.S. 349 (1944).
14. International Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340(1944) ; General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
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to nullify due process prohibitions. Both states, said Justice
Rutledge, thus could tax, insofar as due process was concerned.
Wherefore, the presence or potentiality of a cumulative burden
became the next and paramount issue.
Had Justice Rutledge chosen to follow the cumulative burden
theory of the Western Live Stock court, his ax would have fallen
on the proposed tax right there, for the actuality or potentiality
of two states taxing a transaction added up to a cumulative
burden.
But Justice Rutledge-and this fact sometimes is overlooked-
was never a cumulative burden disciple of the Stone variety.
Had he followed the Stone doctrine, he would have joined the
majority in striking down the Arkansas sales tax. For under
the reasoning of both Justice Rutledge and the majority Tennes-
see had sufficient incidence to sustain a tax due process-wise. In-
stead Justice Rutledge recognized judicially by name what he
said the court already had recognized IN EFFECT in the Ber-
wind-White decision, the right of the state of market to levy on
an interstate transaction.
Viewed in this light, the more than one dozen Commerce Clause
decisions in which Justice Rutledge participated follow a logical,
consistent doctrine. The Iowa use tax in the General Trading Co.
case was upheld, as had been other use taxes in a number of
important decisions, as a state of market tax. The court had
given its blessing to such use taxes during the previous decade
where reciprocal clauses provided that the use tax should give
way to the extent other taxes were levied in the state of origin.
But under the formula propounded at considerable length at the
conclusion of his joint opinion, Justice Rutledge would require
that the state of origin give way to the state of market.y3
The problem in International Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treas-
ury was much simpler. A gross receipts tax was construed,
under the facts, as the equivalent of a sales or use tax, and, as
sale and delivery concurred in the single state, no jurisdictional
question was posed. Yet so knotty was the trilogy decided that
day that while six justices believed the sales and use tax cases
15. The fact that Iowa, in adopting the already judicially approved re-
ciprocal clause granting priority to the state of origin, Minnesota, had asked
for less than Justice Rutledge would have ascribed to it, did not prevent
his validating that portion for which Iowa had asked.
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should go the same way, they did not agree which way they ought
to go.
Applying his basic test of "consequences, not captions," Justice
Rutledge argued that the Iowa use tax and the Arkansas sales
tax were exactly the same thing :17
Surely the state's power to tax is not to turn on the technical
legal effect, relevant for other purposes but not for this, that
'title passes' on delivery to the carrier in Memphis and may
or may not so pass, so far as the record shows, when the
Minnesota shipment is made to Iowa. In the absence of
other and more substantial differences, that irrelevant tech-
nical consideration should not control. However it may be
determined for locating the incidence of loss in transit or
other questions arising among buyer, seller and carrier, for
purposes of taxation that factor alone is the will-o-the-wisp,
insufficient to crux a due process connection from selling to
consuming state and incapable of increasing or reducing any
burden the tax may place upon the interstate transaction. 18
It was this alleged unwillingness of the court to articulate its
thinking and abandon traditional assumptions concerning state
taxation "neither axiomatic in our Constitutional system nor
dictated by the language of the Commerce Clause"'19 with which
Justice Rutledge was quarreling. The primary vice of paying
lip service to abandoned doctrines lay not in the confusion cre-
ated in the public's mind but in the court's own mind, he be-
lieved:
to take what is in essence and totality an interstate
transaction between a state of origin and one of market and
hang the taxing power of either state upon some segmented
incident of the whole and declare that this does or does not
'tax an interstate transaction' is to do two things. It is first
to ignore that any tax hung on such an incident is levied on
an interstate transaction. For the part cannot be separate
from the whole. It is also to ignore the fact that each state,
whether of origin or of market, has by that fact alone a
relation to the whole transaction so substantial as to nullify
16. Justice Frankfurter wrote both majority opinions. Justices Black,
Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge dissented from condemning the Arkansas
sales tax. Justices Roberts and Jackson dissented from condoning the use
tax because it made a tax collector of an out-of-state seller.
17. Quipped the Harvard Law Review: "After these two decisions the
states may readily enough clothe their statutes with the verbal dressing
requisite to save them from the charge of economic exposure." Note, 57
HARv. L. REV. 1088, 1089 (1944).
18. McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 349, 351 (1944).
19. Hellerstein and Hennefield, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54
HARv. L. REV. 949, 950 (1941).
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any due process prohibition. Whether the tax is levied on
the 'sale' or on the 'use', by the one state or by the other,
it is in fact and effect a tax levied on an interstate transac-
tion.20
II
To justices of the traditional school all direct taxes on inter-
state commerce again had become anathema by 1944 unless they
were (1) apportioned, (2) "in lieu of" or (3) use taxes saved by
reciprocal clauses. But to Justice Rutledge's practical mind this
adherence to stare decisis was equally disturbing. He acknowl-
edged the increasing need for new sources of state taxation. He
deplored the tax refuge created in both states by the decision in
J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen.21 He sensed with prophetic in-
sight a resurgence of the pre-1938 thinking which he so often
had lamented.
Since the early days when he "rode circuit" with his Baptist
preacher-father, Justice Rutledge's heroes had been the nation's
founding fathers who "broke with a great past.., faced squarely
the hard facts of that day and seized responsibility for making
the great changes those facts dictated. 22
It was not surprising then that on the lecture platform he so
often warned of
static, stagnant, perfect law ... law that has become
dead.... For without creative force, law stagnates, justice
gives way to anachronism, ossification sets in, and law be-
comes the enemy, the barrier, withering to social and indi-
vidual progress.-
His belief, he reaffirmed often, was
•.. in the living, moving, growing law.., in law not as an
end in itself, but as the great and universal means by which
men move on from the jungle to more and more perfect
unions for living in civilized society.24
But Justice Rutledge recalled with regret that
Once we emerged from our golden age of legal creation, our
profession settled back too easily to rest upon the comfort-
able delusion that the work of creation had been done and
was well nigh, if not altogether, perfect.25
20. McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 349, 357 (1944).
21. 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
22. Address before Federal Bar Association, 1948, reprinted, THE FED-
ERAL EMiPLoYEE, November, 1948, 7.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 17.
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Faced with the "hard facts" of the court's vacillating views
on taxation, Justice Rutledge cast his lot with the state of market.
This was by no means an original concept, as it had been recom-
mended-as a legislative remedy-by eminent legal scholars in
the tax field,2' had been endorsed by the National Association of
State Administrators and the Interstate Commission on Conflict-
ing Taxation, and was embodied in the Harrison Resolution
adopted by the Senate in 1935.27
Justice Rutledge's opinion is filled with references to present
and potential cumulative burdens. But he indicates the wide
divergence of his views from those of the Stone school when he
expresses doubt that a potential risk "will have any substantial
effect in restraining the commerce such as the actual application
of that power would have." 28
26. "Effective solution of the problem of state sales and use taxes requires
that in each situation only one state be permitted to tax the sale. Congress
might enact a statute which would forbid sales or use taxes on goods hav-
ing an interstate origin or destination except by the state into which the
property is moved for use or consumption therein. It could authorize that
state to tax all interstate sales and all goods having an interstate origin.
Such a statute would conform to the terms of most of the existing state
statutes. Selection of the state of consumption is Justified by the fact that
sales and use taxes, in essence taxes on consumption, are largely borne by
purchaser-consumers. Their local purchasers pay the tax, they should be
in a position to use their ballots to eliminate such taxes. That result is
achieved if the taxes they pay are imposed by the legislators the local
purchaser-consumers elect." Hellerstein and Hennefield, supra, note 19 at
966. (Emphasis added).
It should be noted that Messrs. Hellerstein and Hennefield favor only
legislative action. For in their crystalline anaysis of judicial action during
the late Stone Age, they say: "It seems clear that the Supreme Court's
attempts to deal with the conflict between state and national interests have
failed and must inevitably fail .... Judicial action alone has not provided
and cannot provide adequate solution to the problem. On the other hand,
a solution is imperative, and the very nature of the solution must be na-
tional in scope." Id. at 961, 962.
27. By this resolution Congress would authorize non-discriminatory "taxes
or excises levied by any state upon sales of tangible personal property, or
measured by sales of tangible personal property," as applied to interstate
sales when imposed by the state into which the property is moved for use
or consumption therein.
28. "It may be that the mere risk of double taxation would not have the
same consequences, given always of course a sufficient due process connec-
tion with the taxing states, that actual double taxation has, or may have,
for application of the commerce clause prohibition. Risk, of course, is not
irrelevant to burden or to the clogging effect the rule against undue burden
is intended to prevent. But in these situations it may be doubted, on entirely
practical grounds, that the mere risk Tennessee may apply its taxing power
to these transactions will have any substantial effect in restraining the
commerce such as the actual application of that power would have. In any
event, whether or not the choice must be made now or, as I think, has been
Washington University Open Scholarship
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While Justice Rutledge would not require exclusive power for
the state of market, he would require the state of origin's levy
to give credit to the extent of, or the full amount of, the state of
consumption's tax:
If in this case it were necessary 29 to choose between the state
of origin and that of market for the exercise of exclusive
power to tax, or for requiring allowance of credit in order
to avoid the cumulative burden, in my opinion the choice
should lie in favor of the state of market rather than the
state of origin. The former is the state where the goods
must come in competition with those sold locally. It is the
one where the burden of the tax necessarily will fall equally
on both classes of trade. To choose the tax of the state of
origin presents at least some possibilities that the burden it
imposes on its local trade, with which the interstate traffic
does not compete, at any rate directly, will be heavier than
that placed by the consuming state on its local business of
the same character. If therefore choice has to be made,
whether as a matter of exclusive power to tax or as one of
allowing credit, it should be in favor of the state of market
or consumption as the one most certain to place the same
tax load on both the interstate and competing local business.
Hence, if the risk of taxation by both states may be said to
have the same constitutional consequences, under the Com-
merce Clause, as taxation in actuality by both, the Arkansas
tax, rather than the power of Tennessee to tax, should
stand- 0
III
Another decision of far reaching import also was handed down
January 6, 1944. In Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota 3l the court
upset a half-century of precedent by ruling that Minnesota, as
the state of domicile, could enforce a personal property tax on
Northwest Airlines' entire fleet of airplanes, even though the
company's scheduled route mileage in Minnesota was only 14 per
cent and its scheduled plane mileage was only 16 per cent of the
company's total scheduled route mileage and scheduled plane
mileage, respectively, in the United States.
made, it should go in favor of Arkansas, not Tennessee." McLeod v. Dil-
worth, 322 U.S. 349, 361 (1940).
29. The use of the word "if" here is in obvious recognition that the case
at hand did not necessitate any ruling beyond that concerning the consti-
tutionality of the Arkansas tax. His views on restricting any Tennessee
tax are dicta, as no Tennessee tax was involved. But his decision to favor
the state of market, an act which bordered on, indeed if it did not encroach
upon the legislative field, demanded the explanation.
30. McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 349, 361 (1944).
31. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
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The majority opinion, written by Justice Frankfurter, raised
many an eyebrow because of its abandonment of the apportion-
ment formula enunciated in Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Penn-
sylvania32 in 1891. Congress, it held instead, never had disturbed
a domiciliary state's power to tax except where property or a
portion of fungible units were outside the state.33
Chief Justice Stone and Justices Reed, Roberts and Rutledge
dissented. They pointed out that the constitutional basis for
taxation of chattels, unlike intangibles, had always been physical
presence, not domicile of owners. While extended here only to
the field of aviation, they foresaw the possibility of the entire
doctrine of the taxation of tangibles being removed from the
protective mantle of apportionment.3 4
IV
When he faced his first case involving legislatively delegated
power of taxation to cities,35 Justice Rutledge again applied his
familiar test of "consequences not captions":
It is no answer ... that the tax is neither prohibitive nor
discriminatory on the face of the ordinance. . . . Not tax
in a vacuum of words but its practical consequences. 36
As a condition precedent to selling even five cents worth of
goods within the city, Richmond had required the purchase of a
$50 license, assessed alike against both local merchants and
"drummers." In addition, the ordinance provided for a tax of
one-half of one per cent of annual earnings, receipts, fees and
32. 141 U.S. 18 (1891) (A state may tax an interstate carrier engaged
in running railroad cars into, through and out of the state and having at
all times a large number of cars within the state . . . by taking as the
basis of assessment such proportion of its capital stock as the number of
miles of railroad over which its cars are run within the state bears to the
whole number of miles in all the states over which its cars are run).
33. New York Central v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584 (1905), where none was
found permanently outside the state, although 12 to 64 per cent was outside
the state at some time.
34. "To refuse now to apply the rule of apportionment to petitioner's
airplanes, after a half-century of its application by this court as the means
of avoiding prohibited multiple state tax burdens of vehicles of interstate
transportation; to extend to airplanes moving interstate over fixed routes
on regular schedules the rule that intangibles may be taxed at the business
domicile whether or not taxed elsewhere; and to revive the abandoned doc-
trine that vessels may be taxed in full at the home port, while rejecting
the correlative rule that they are exempt from taxation elsewhere, is to
disregard the teachings of experience and precedent." Northwest Airlines
v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 320 (1944).
35. Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
36. Id. at 431.
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commissions in excess of $1,000. Richmond had sought to justify
the tax as a "local incident," non-discriminatory and without pos-
sibility of a cumulative burden.
But Justice Rutledge, writing the majority opinion, saw the
danger of discrimination magnified by the fact that it was a
municipal tax, which could be levied in succession by every city
a drummer visited, without relation to volume, its net effect that
of a $50 toll gate into every city.3 7
Justices Douglas, Black and Murphy dissented, demanding
proof that there was sufficient cumulative burden as to be dis-
criminatory.
V
If there were any doubt after McLeod v. Dilworth and Nippert
v. City of Richmond as to Justice Rutledge's philosophy of "di-
rect" taxation, that doubt was resolved by two documents he
drafted and/or delivered in 1946. The first was A Declaration
of Legal Faith,3 8 a compilation of lectures he gave that year at
the University of Kansas. The other was his opinion in Freeman
v. Hewit,39 a case involving the levying of an unapportioned
Indiana gross receipts tax on the proceeds of capital stock sold
on the New York Stock Exchange for the benefit of an Indiana
resident's estate. Justice Rutledge concurred in the majority
opinion that the tax should be struck down but dissented vio-
lently from the grounds on which the court bottomed its decision.
The majority opinion, he accused, "is a reversion to ideas once
prevalent, but long since repudiated . . . which, if now resur-
rected for general application, will strike down state taxes in a
great variety of forms sustained consistently of late."40
Not since Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, has the
notion prevailed that the mere existence of power in Con-
gress to regulate commerce excludes the states from exact-
ing revenue from it through exercise of their powers of
taxation.41
This was the thesis developed in his Kansas lectures, 42 where
he asserted that time has rejected the Marshallian "emphasis
37. "The tax here in -question contains too many probabilities, and we
think actualities, for exclusion of or discrimination against interstate com-
merce in favor of local competing business." Id. at 434.
38. RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH (1947).
39. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
40. Id. at 261, 262.
41. Id. at 262.
42. Rutledge, op. cit. supra note 38 at 55.
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upon the 'exclusiveness' of Congress' power" and its corollary
regard of "the commerce clause as effective to nullify state laws
'of its own force' without reference to any inference of Congress'
intent from its silence. ' '4
The early broad idea of complete and total mutual 'exclusive-
ness' departed with Cooley v. Board of Wardens, never to
return. The 'silence of Congress,' taken as an expression of
legislative will, no longer is adequate for outlawing state
laws. Judges do not now seem to find conflict between what
the state has done and what Congress has not done in its
'silently expressed will.' Like others, judicial fingers burnt
tend to avoid the flame. The idea that Congress has 'occu-
pied the field,' and thereby precluded legislation by the
states, though not altogether eliminated, works within nar-
rower confines. ... And the notion has been put to rest, one
may hope, that the commerce clause is itself either a limi-
tation upon Congress' power within the field of commerce or
one upon the conjoined and consistent exercise of the powers
of Congress and the states.44 (Emphasis added).
Justice Rutledge could hope, but there was nothing in the
majority opinion of Freeman v. Hewit to fulfill his hope. For the
rationalization of the majority opinion, as he reiterated it, was
that "the tax as applied is laid 'directly on' interstate commerce,
43. Of Marshall's trinitarian conception-(1) broad definition of com-
merce, (2) broad idea of regulation and (3) exclusiveness of Congressional
regulation of commerce-Justice Rutledge wrote: "Time has confirmed
Marshall's ideas of two of them. Thus, his broad conception of 'commerce'
has stood, though not without wavering, as we have shown. As to 'regula-
tion,' the effects of powers when exercised, rather than their labels or pur-
ported abstract 'nature,' came to be the more important thing. Not 'regula-
tion' therefore or 'commerce,' but 'complete exclusion' was to give way. Not
altogether, however. Exclusion the clause did provide. But it was not
necessarily or, as it turned out, appropriately, to be complete and total."
Id. at 67.
Justice Rutledge also reviewed at length Justice Taney's diametrically
opposing views that (1) in the silence of Congress the state may act, and
(2) implied negations of state power, like affirmative exertions of federal,
come from Congress, not from the courts or from the Constitution operating
independently of Congress' will: "In the long flood of litigation which the
prohibitive aspect of the commerce clause has created, Marshall's universal
exclusion has been rejected; and Taney's denial of any implied direct con-
stitutional exclusion, in his transfer of the exclusion from constitutional
grounding to legislative foundation in Congress' silence, likewise has not
stood the test of time. But the gist of Marshall's work has survived. And
Taney's work aided in bringing it down to practical proportions appropriate
for a federal democracy, in which the states and the Congress largely may
work together, concurrently regulating commerce, but in which still the
federal power is supreme, will override inconsistent local action, and on
occasion will enable the states to act where otherwise they might do so."
Id. at 70.
44. Id. at 70.
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is a levy 'on the very sale' or 'the very process' of such commerce,
is therefore and solely thereby a 'burden' on it, and subsequently
is an exaction the commerce clause forbids. '45
Justice Rutledge found not only his hopes dashed but his worst
fears confirmed. His concurring opinion was an intellectual bill
of indictment, so keen was his personal disappointment at seeing
the court revert to the formalism of another day,46 thereby de-
clining his direction to a more pragmatic approach.
His opinion charged first that by grounding its new decision
on a wholly different foundation, the court either had qualified
or repudiated the doctrine of Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen.47 The
Adams case had held the same Indiana tax invalid when applied,
without apportionment, to gross receipts derived from interstate
sales of goods made by Indiana manufacturers, who sold and
shipped them to purchasers in other states. This time the tax
was struck down again, but solely because it was a "direct" tax
on interstate commerce. The telltale tests of the Adams case-
(1) lack of apportionment and (2) danger of multiple taxation-
were ignored,48 Justice Rutledge complained.
As Justice Rutledge saw it, the vices of such a decision were
legion. He had complained before that the Adams ruling created
a tax refuge by relieving interstate commerce from liability to
pay taxes, unless apportioned, in either state. By ignoring its
previous saving clause, "without apportionment," the new deci-
sion, Justice Rutledge believed, could give tax exemption even
where the levy was apportioned:
The trend of recent decisions has been toward sustaining
state taxes formerly regarded as outlawed by the commerce
clause. The present decision, by its reversion to the formal
and discarded grounding in the 'direct incidence' of the tax,
is a reversal of that trend. It is one, moreover, unnecessary
for sustaining the result the court has reached. Its conse-
45. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 261 (1946).
46. Justic Frankfurter's position was unequivocal: "Nor is there any
warrant in the constitutional principles heretofore applied by this court to
support the notion that a state may be allowed one single-tax-worth of
direct interference with the free flow of commerce." Id. at 256.
47. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
48. Referring to the cumulative burden doctrine which flashed brilliantly
in the legal sky in 1938 and then seemed quickly to burn itself out, Justice
Frankfurter wrote: "If another state has taxed the same interstate trans-
action, the burdensome consequences to interestate trade are undeniabl. But
that, for the time being, only one state has taxed is irrelevant to the kind
of freedom of trade which the Commerce Clause generated." Id. at 256.
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quence, if followed in logical application to apportioned
taxes, will be to outlaw them, for they bear as 'directly' on
'the commerce itself' as does the tax now stricken down in
its present application. 9
In short, Justice Rutledge took the majority decision to mean
that, unlike the Adams court, the present court would hold the
Indiana tax invalid even if apportioned.5 0 His own invalidation
of the tax, he was careful to point out, was designed to avoid the
"cumulative and therefore discriminatory tax burdens which
would rest on or seriously threaten interstate commerce if more
than one state is allowed to impose the tax, as does Indiana, upon
the gross receipts from the sale without apportionment or credit
for taxes validly imposed elsewhere."5' 1 (Emphasis added).
Thus he reaffirmed the state of market tax philosophy he had
introduced in McLeod v. Dilforth,:
I think the solution most nearly in accord with the commerce
clause, at once most consistent with its purpose and least
objectionable for producing either evils it had no design to
bring or practical difficulties in administration, would be to
vest the power to tax in the state of the market, subject to
power in the forwarding state also to tax by allowing credit
to the full amount of any tax paid or due at the destination.
This too is more nearly consonant with what the more recent
decisions have allowed, if full account is taken of their
effects.52 (Emphasis added).
Justice Rutledge acknowledged that his state of market for-
mula would deny the power to tax to the state of origin,53 but he
pointed out that the forwarding state "has no greater power
49. Id. at 282.
50. Id. at 283.
51. Ibid.
52. Id. at 279.
53. He recognized "three alternative methods for avoiding the multiple
state tax burden: (1) To apply the Adams ruling, stopping such taxes at
the source, unless the tax is apportioned . . . (2) to rule that either the
state of origin or the state of market, but not both, can levy the exaction;
(3) to determine factually in each case whether application of the tax can
be made by one state without incurring actual danger of its being made
in another or the risk of real uncertainty whether in fact it will be so
made.... The Adams ruling ... creates for many situations a tax refuge
for interstate commerce and does this in both states .... To require factual
determination of forbidden effects in each case would be to invite costly
litigation, make decision turn in some cases, perhaps many, on doubtful
facts or conclusions, and encourage the enactment of legislation involving
those consequences." Id. at 278, 279. It is to be noticed that he purposefully
omitted reference to a fourth alternative the "leave it to Congress" view,
first enunciated by Justice Taney and followed consistently since Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, supra, by Justice Black.
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under the Adams ruling and none at all under the present one
if it is to be applied consistently and, as I think, this can be taken
to outlaw both unapportioned and apportioned taxes. 5 4
Justice Rutledge did not like the Adams decision. He believed
the court (1) therein created a tax refuge, (2) failed to dis-
tinguish the tax on manufacturing in American Mfg. Co. v. St.
Louisss from admitted gross receipts taxes, and (3) by its very
thesis, ruled out any taxation by the state of destination.0 But
he much preferred the Adams decision to that in Freeman v.
Hewit. For under the Adams ruling, taxes in the state of origin
at least would be saved by apportionment. This fact, coupled with
the court's recognition of use taxes and the state of market tax
in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White, was the keystone of Justice
Rutledge's tax formula.5 7 Under the latter decisions he believed
a tax by New York on the Freeman transaction would be up-
held:58
Indeed, in my 'opinion, the necessary effect of McGoldrick
v. Berwind-White Co., as appellee asserts, is to sustain
power in the state of market to tax 'to the fullest extent,'
without apportionment by non-discriminatory taxes of gen-
eral applicability, transactions essentially no different from
the ones involved in this case and in the Adams case. 0
Taking cognizance of the court's distinction of the McGoldrick
case on the basis of the local incident of "transfer of possession,"
Justice Rutledge said:
Apart from the reasons I have set forth above for regarding
this as not controlling, that basis was flatly repudiated in
Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, as adequate for sustain-
ing a tax having otherwise the forbidden effects and fea-
tures. So here, in my opinion, it is hardly adequate to dis-
tinguish the Adams case, leaving it unimpaired, or to differ-
entiate consistently the broader ruling made in this case.20
(Emphasis added).
54. Id. at 280.
55. 250 U.S. 459 (1921).
56. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 268 (1946).
57. For an illuminating discussion of whether substantial barriers to
interstate trade should be struck down until Congress can be induced to
approve them, or whether they should stand until Congress disapproves
them, see Lockhart, State Tax Barriers to Interstate Trade, 53 HARV. L.
RBv. 1257 (1940).
58. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 280 (1946).
59. Id. at 281.
60. Ibid.
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Thus Justice Rutledge's conclusion to the whole matter:
I therefore agree with the appellee that the effect of the
Berwind-White ruling was in substance, though not in
words, to qualify the Adams decision, and that the combined
effect of the two cases, taken together, was to permit the
state of the market to tax the interstate transaction, but to
deny this power to the forwarding state, unless by credit or
otherwise it should make provision for apportionment1
(Emphasis added).
Being the levy of a state of origin, without the saving grace
of apportionment or credit to the state of market, the Indiana
tax, he held, must fall.
VI
A widely divergent view of Justice Rutlbdge's theory concern-
ing multiple taxation is presented in a scholarly review of the
late justice's tenure, which appeared recently. 2 Alleging a "shift
in position"'' by Justice Rutledge between the McLeod v. Dil-
worth and the Freeman v. Hewit decisions, the author said in
part:
Although he was primarily worried about the grounds of
Justice Frankfurter's opinion, Justice Rutledge was also
worried about the possibility of multiple taxation of the pro-
ceeds of Mr. Freeman's interstate sale. To that question
61. Ibid.
62. Rockwell, Justice Rutledge on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce,
35 CORNELL L. Q. 500 (1950).
63. In alleging a "shift of position," Mr. Rockwell cites from Justice
Rutledge's A Declaration of Legal Faith: "His shift in position on this
question of potential multipe tax burden is foreshadowed, inferentially, by
his remark in the University of Kansas lectures that 'rationalization which
straddles conflict or ignores it leads eventually to irreconcilable results and
thus to the necessity for reformulating reasoning.'" Id. at 500. It is sub-
mitted that when this extract is read in its entire context and compared
with similar wording in his Freeman v. Hewit opinion it is obvious that
Justice Rutledge was referring to the court's chameleonic character in the
early "forties" and not to any prospective personal change: "Nevertheless
the general problem of adjustment remains. It has only been transferred
to a level more tolerant of both state and federal legislative action. On
this level a new or renewed emphasis on facts and practical considerations
has been allowed to work. Notwithstanding this, old doctrine retains in-
fluence. Dogma and formulae, reflecting the certitude of earlier swings in
policy, continue to appear. Practical considerations and outworn theories
at times remain commingled, so as to obscure, if not quite conceal under-
lying conflicts of theory and policy concerning the negation's proper scope
and application. This resulting pattern, if not kaleidoscopic, still affords
highly convenient variables for decision in specific controversies. More often
than might be expected from such a footing, reconcilable results have been
secured. But rationalization which straddles conflict or ignores it leads
eventually to irreconcilable results and thus to necessity for reformulating
reasoning." Rutledge, op. cit. supra note 38 at 69.
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he addressed the latter half of his opinion. In this case the
state of origin, Indiana, had taxed the proceeds of the sale.
New York had not, but could. Hence a potential multiple
tax burden existed. The majority forestalled this by voiding
the Indiana tax, but without reference to the multiple burden
issue. Although the bare unexercised power of another state
to tax does not produce a cumulative tax burden, it opens
the door to it-a door which Justice Rutledge wanted closed
at a time when new sources of revenue were being sought.
He had objected to this closed door policy, which he now
deemed necessary, when the majority espoused it because of
a similar potential multiple tax burden in McLeod v. Dil-
worth. In that case he argued that if it were necessary to
choose between the taxing power of the state of market and
the state of origin, he would prefer the former. There the
majority had closed the door on the state of market because
the door was open to the state of origin. At least that was
the implication according to Justice Rutledge's reading of
the opinion. He would have upheld the tax by the state of
market-the existence of a potential multiple tax burden
notwithstanding. In the present case the situation was ex-
actly reversed; the state of origin has taxed; the state of
market may tax. This time Justice Rutledge did not like the
potential multiple tax situation. It lures tax-thirsty states.
Confusion and expensive litigation follow. 4  (Emphasis
added).
While Justice Rutledge's opinion in the McLeod v. Dilworth
case overflowed with references to the evils of cumulative bur-
dens, it contained no objection to the "closed door policy" to
which the author alludes. Indeed, it was because he objected to
the "open door policy" which he said due process accorded to
both states that he found it necessary to choose between the state
of origin and the state of market, and chose the latter.
VII
Justice Rutledge's permissible area of direct taxation probably
reached its widest-and certainly its most controversial-bounds
later in 1947 when he joined Justice Douglas in dissenting to a
decision 5 which invalidated a New York City gross receipts tax
on stevedoring. In a 5-2-1-1 decision the court held that as load-
ing and unloading are essential parts of transportation, they can-
64. Rockwell, supra note 61 at 500.
65. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Co., 330 U. S. 422 (1947).
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not be separated from interstate commerce for purposes of tax-
ation.
Although the case exactly paralleled Puget Sound Stevedor-
ing Co. v. State Tax Commission," the court granted certiorari
because petitioners argued that subsequent holdings" of the
court had indicated that the reasons which underlie that decision
were no longer controlling. The court overruled the suggestion
and affirmed the Puget Sound decision, holding "those activities
are not only preliminary to but are an essential part of the safety
and convenience of the transportation itself.""8 (Emphasis
added).
The dissenting opinion, which Justice Rutledge endorsed, con-
ceded that a direct tax was being levied, but contended that by
its very nature as a tax on gross receipts from activities solely
within New York City, it provided for automatic apportionment
and precluded multiple taxation. The possibility of another levy
on loading and unloading at the other end of the interstate jour-
ney was dismissed with the statement:
It is no more relevant that stevedoring is involved in both
cases, than is the fact that two States may impose property
taxes on terminals or trackage within their respective
borders.69
Citing the line of cases beginning with Maine v. Grand Trunk
Ry. Co.70 "which sustained gross receipts taxes on business en-
gaged in interstate commerce, including transportation and com-
munication, and the new line of cases beginning with Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, which made apportioning the
decisive factor," the dissent held that both the Puget Sound and
Carter & Weekes taxes "therefore seem unobjectionable. '71 It
66. 302 U. S. 90 (1937).
67. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938);
Southern Pacific v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167 (1938) (Goods having come
to rest, California use tax held applicable to railroad's out-of-state pur-
chases, even though some parts were made-to-order and were installed
immediately on interstate transportation facilities); McGoldrick v. Ber-
wind-White Co., 309 U. S. 388 (1940); Dept. Treasury v. Wood Preserving
Co., 313 U. S. 62 (1940) (Indiana gross receipts tax sustained where seller,
a Delaware corporation with principal place of business in Pennsylvania,
obtained ties from Indiana producers and delivered them in Indiana to
buyer in completion of sales contract made outside Indiana).
68. Joseph v. Carter & Weeks Co., 330 U. S. 422, 428 (1947).
69. Id. at 438.
70. 142 U. S. 217 (1891).
71. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Co., 330 U. S. 422, 441 (1947).
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reminded that the "subject matter" test of Robbins v. Shelby
County Taxing District,72 was abandoned by the McGoldrick v.
Berwind-White court. In its place the court,
... following Wiloil Oil Corp. v. Pa., 294 U. S. 169, upheld
a non-discriminatory tax on the sale to a buyer within the
taxing state of a commodity shipped interstate in perform-
ance of a sales contract, not upon the ground that the de-
livery was not a part of interstate commerce... but because
the tax was not a prohibited regulation of, or burden on,
that commerce. Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois
Pub. Service Comm., 314 U.S. 498, 505.7 3
In recommending an approach in the stevedoring case, the
dissent quoted the late Justice Brandeis: "'The logic of words
should yield to the logic of realities.' Dissenting in Di Santo v.
Pa., 273 U.S. 34, 43. '"74
But in final lament it added:
The failure of the Court to adhere to the philosophy of our
recent cases corroborates the impression which some of us
had that Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, marked the end
of one cycle under the Commerce Clause and the beginning
of another.75
VIII
A court biographer 76 wrote of Justice Rutledge in 1947:
"Rutledge is merely one of those who call them as they see them."
Thus in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone,77 where he cast the
pivotal ballot in sustaining a non-discriminatory, apportioned
franchise tax which Mississippi had levied on a pipeline running
through that state, Justice Rutledge wrote a separate opinion in
order to call the tax as he saw it-one laid directly on interstate
commerce, but saved by apportionment.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Reed, with only Jus-
tices Douglas, Murphy and Black joining, had refused to go that
far. Instead it distinguished the "local activities in maintaining,
keeping in repair, and otherwise manning the facilities of the
system in Mississippi" as "events apart from the flow of com-
merce," although admitting "of course the interstate commerce
could not be conducted without these local activities."
72. 120 U. S. 489 (1887).
73. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Co., 330 U. S. 422, 440 (1947).
74. Id. at 444.
75. Ibid.
76. McCuNE, THE NINE YOUNG MEN, 206 (1947).
77. 335 U. S. 80 (1947).
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Accepting the Mississippi Supreme Court's interpretation that
the tax was not on the "privilege of doing business," 78 as the
phrase was meant in those statutes which had been held invalid,
the majority sought to determine if the "local incidents" essential
to interstate commerce were so burdensome as to be prohibited.
It noted that the court had approved several excise taxes which
affected interstate commerce as much or more than the Missis-
sippi levy.7 9 But the court declined to take the step for which
Justice Rutledge had been waiting-recognition that incidents
"essential to" commerce were commerce itself.80 Instead it held:
"These are events apart from the flow of commerce."
Justice Rutledge had always looked askance at the "local inci-
dent" escape clauses,81 conjured up by the court, he believed, to
rescue taxes it favored from its own forbidden area of "direct"
taxation.
He suspected that the healing waters of apportionment were
being misused here to legitimize the court's current brainchild,
"These are events apart from the flow of commerce."
He acknowledged that there might be only a verbal difference
-for this case-in the distinction between taxes "not upon,
though affecting commerce" and "taxable events sufficiently sepa-
78. Several factors complicated the picture. The petitioner had not
qualified to "do business" in Mississippi, was conceded to be doing only an
interstate business, and by stipulation had admitted it had received no
"protection" from Mississippi-the crux of the majority's decision-other
than that for which it had paid its ad valorem tax. A 1942 statute pro-
vided for a "franchise or excise tax levied upon every corporation" equal
to roughly one and one-half per cent of "value of capital used, invested or
employed in the exercise of any power, privilege or right enjoyed by such
organization within this state." It was the second time the tax had been
upheld as applied to interstate pipelines. A previous Mississippi statute
which required a state license as prerequisite to entering business or ex-
ercising privileges was held invalid. State Tax Commission v. Interstate
Natural Gas Co., 284 U. S. 41 (1931).
79. Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202 (1944) (fee for the
privilege of using state courts, exacted by the state from a business licensed
by the United States to handle customs charges); Aero-Mayflower Transit
Co. v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 332 U. S. 495 (1947) (special
privilege tax upon an interstate automobile transportation company for the
use of state roads).
80. The four dissenting justices agreed with Justice Rutledge, of course,
that a direct tax was being laid here: "For we are all agreed that where
the only 'local incident' is the fact of interstate commerce-that the inter-
state pipe line goes through Mississippi.. . ..." Memphis Natural Gas Co.
v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 102 (1947).
81. As differentiated from Justice Rutledge's view of the same as only
the sine qua non factual incidents necessary to nullify due process pro-
hibitions. See note 20 supra.
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rate from the commerce, whether by reason of apportionment
or otherwise, to sustain the tax. '8 2 But the distinction, he be-
lieved, might lead to a reversion to "rationalizations which make
merely verbal formulae without reflection of difference in sub-
stantive effects controlling in these matters. 8 3
The tax measured up to his four requirements for exemption
from the Commerce Clause ban: (1) a factual connection to give
jurisdiction, (2) non-discrimination, (3) apportionment, (4)
absence of a cumulative burden. He thus protested limiting the
effectiveness of apportionment to the validation of "events apart
from the commerce" when he deemed it sufficient to justify a
direct tax.
Since the appellant transacted no intrastate business in Missis-
sippi and the parties by agreement had stipulated that the only
protection or enjoyment of privilege was that for which ad
valorem taxes had been paid, the issue finally simmered down to:
Can a state impose more than one tax of the same type on the
apportioned capital investment of a wholly interstate business?
The four majority justices avoided the question by holding the
events "apart from interstate commerce." The four dissenting
justices answered, No. Justice Rutledge answered, Yes."4
IX
Mississippi's pipe lines were back in court again in 1948.85
This time it was oil instead of gas lines involved, the tax was for
the privilege of doing businesso instead of for "protection" of
82. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80,97 (1947).
83. Id. at 98.
84. "Nothing in the commerce clause or its great purpose forbids such an
exaction. Nor is the state limited to a single exaction for different or like
protections afforded, so long as each is safe-guarded against prohibited
effects upon commerce, as are those laid by Mississippi and their aggregate
cannot be shown to contravene the clause's purpose." Id. at 98, 99.
Justice Rutledge reiterated this view in Aero-Mayflower Transit Co. v.
Railroad Commission, 332 U. S. 495, 506 (1947). There Montana had levied
a fiat tax of $10 per vehicle and a gross revenue tax, with a minimum of$15 per vehicle, on a foreign corporation doing an exclusively interstate
business. The statute specified that it was "for the use of the highways"
and "not on the privilege of doing interstate business." The petitioner
challenged the double tax on the single event. Writing the majority of
opinion-incidentally his only opinion in the field of taxation to which
there was no dissent-Justice Rutledge said: "It is of no consequence that
the state has seen fit to lay two exactions, substantially identical, rather
than combine them into one, or that appellant pays other taxes which are
in fact devoted to highway maintenance."
85. Interstate Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U. S. 663 (1948).
86. In Ozark Pipe Line Co. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555 (1925) the court
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the investment, and again the statute was upheld by a scant 5-4
margin. It was Justice Burton's concurrence "solely on the
ground that the tax ... was ... on the privilege of operating
a pipe line.., in intrastate business" which saved the tax.
Justice Burton's qualified concurrence was necessary in view
of Justice Rutledge's reaffirmation of his apportioned direct tax
theory in introducing his majority decision:
We do not pause to consider whether the business of operat-
ing the intrastate pipe lines is interstate commerce, for even
if we assume that it is, Mississippi has power to impose the
tax involved in this case.87 (Emphasis added).
Involved was a pipe line system lying wholly within the state,
originating at the various lease wells and terminating at loading
racks or tanks which the appellant maintained beside an inter-
state railroad. The appellant was paid a fee for pumping the
oil from the wells to loading racks or storage tanks and another
fee for pumping the oil into tank cars. Delivery of the oil to
appellant by the owner was accompanied by instructions for
shipping it interstate. Storage while awaiting tank cars never
exceeded one week. Mississippi imposed a franchise tax on the
privilege of operating any intrastate business, including the oper-
ation of a pipe line, measured by two per cent of the gross re-
ceipts. The statute specifically exempted oil delivered directly
into interstate oil pipe lines."
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the interstate jour-
ney had not begun when the appellant completed his last -act, the
delivery of the oil from the loading racks or storage tanks to the
railroad cars. It pointed out that the oil could have been diverted
by the owner to downstate points, and held that the shipping
contract listing an out-of-state destination was not controlling
as to the interstate character of the shipment.
But Justice Rutledge again left no doubt that he was approv-
ing a direct tax on interstate commerce:
The statute is not invalidated by the commerce clause of the
Federal Constitution merely because, unlike the statute at-
tacked in Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone... it imposes a 'direct'
had held that an annual franchise tax, apportioned by the amount of capital
and surplus employed within the taxing state was invalid as a tax "upon
the privilege or right to do business."
87. Interstate Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U. S. 663, 666 (1948).
88. In contrast to that deposited for pick-up at the depot. After June,
1946, the company began shipping all its oil through these trunk lines,
elminating any tax question posed by their delay in transit.
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tax on the 'privilege' of engaging in interstate commerce.
Any notions to the contrary should'not have survived Maine
v. Grand Trunk R. Co., which flatly rules the case at bar.
That case sustained a state statute which imposed upon an
interstate railroad corporation 'an annual excise tax (meas-
ured by apportioned gross receipts) for the privilege of ex-
ercising its franchises in this state.'8 9
Justice Rutledge found (1) sufficient factual connection to give
due process jurisdiction, (2) no discrimination, (3) apportion-
ment unnecessary because of the nature of the subject, and there-
fore (4) no possibility of a cumulative burden. In view of this
he asserted it was unnecessary to consider the Mississippi court's
finding that the operations were intrastate.
The four dissenting justices, speaking through Justice Reed,
who had written the majority opinion in the Memphis Natural
Gas Co. case, found the Grand Trunk case inapposite. That deci-
sion, they held, stands only for the proposition that when a cor-
poration doing both interstate and intrastate business qualifies
to do the latter, the state may then-and then only-impose as
the basis of its franchise tax a gross receipts levy apportioned
to the mileage within the state. But this was the ultima Thule
of the dissent's area of permissible taxation. A state cannot tax
the privilege of doing a wholly interstate business, the dissent
reiterated, "because the Commerce Clause... does not leave to
the states any power to permit or refuse the carrying on of inter-
state commerce."90
The case thus served only to enrich the Mississippi state treas-
ury by $20,296.36 and to emphasize the wide variation in tax
philosophy within the court in 1948. A clear majority was not
given to either the issue of whether the transaction was inter-
state or intrastate, or to the more pertinent question of whether
an apportioned tax could now be levied for the privilege of doing
an interstate busines.
SUUMARY
Time alone will evaluate Justice Rutledge's contribution to
constitutional interpretation. But none can ever doubt the sin-
cerity of his purpose or fail to admire his unceasing effort to
articulate the court's thinking on the recurring problem of state
taxation.
89. Interstate Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U. S. 663, 666 (1948).
90. Id. at 680.
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Justice Rutledge entered the forum in the spirit of a true
scholar, bent on scientific research. Due deference was paid to
the wisdom of those who preceded him. But no blind obeisance
was made to the decisions of yesteryear if the fact situations
which fathered them had been displaced by new problems with
new consequences in the commercial world he observed around
him.
His tax philosophy was oriented to the consumer who paid the
taxes. Hence his constant attention and preference to the state
of market.
He believed it was to indulge in fancy and to ignore fact to
hold that interstate commerce continues up to the moment of
delivery and ends one inch short of the goods' destination. To
so hold was to exalt the "local incident," to stimulate vain
searches for the will-o-the-wisp.
Justice Rutledge found no constitutional objection to direct
taxation of interstate commerce simply because it was "direct."
The evil to be avoided, he pointed out, was only a cumulative or
discriminatory burden.
His judicial yardstick, unlike that of the traditional school,
did not provide any basis for measuring "directness" or "in-
directness." It measured only discrimination and apportionabil-
ity. If an interstate transaction was non-discriminatory and ap-
portionable, the pro rata tax was sustained.
In short, he would ascribe no "holy of holies" deference to that
area found by formalistic decisions to be "directly" burdened and
therefore sacrosanct.
Justice Rutledge found a contradiction in the court's refusal,
on the one hand, of permission to states to tax the privilege of
doing an apportioned part of interstate business and recognition,
on the other hand, of the power of the state to include that same
portion of interstate business in computing the basis of a privi-
lege tax on doing an intrastate business, no matter how relatively
small the intrastate activities.
He recognized that interstate commerce in the transportation
field was not a single unsegregable transaction but was the aggre-
gate of all intrastate transactions which went into its completion.
Since intrastate transactions duplicating the segregated func-
tions could be taxed by the respective states, he believed that the
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states also should be permitted to tax the apportioned part of
interstate commerce.
This, of course, would short circuit the traditional determina-
tion by the court, case by case, of what is interstate commerce.
But removing interstate commerce from the realm of "mooted"
questions would have been all right with Justice Rutledge. For
he believed that a formula applicable only to a single situation
was not a formula at all, but only an explanation.
The court had permitted state non-discriminatory taxation for
the use of state facilities, upon the property used in interstate
commerce, upon production for commerce, upon net proceeds
therefrom, and, when used as a measure of franchise taxes, an
apportioned levy on the gross receipts of interstate transporta-
tion and communication.
Justice Rutledge indicated that he would go even further and
permit an apportioned levy on gross receipts of interstate trans-
portation "straight across the, board" if the transaction lent it-
self to proper apportioning.
To the conservative bloc within the Supreme Court this was
the grossest heresy, an about-face no less radical than the doc-
trine of Roger Taney.
Death ended this duel of taxation philosophies, and the con-
servative view prevails today. But the shifting sands of time
have wrought many changes in Supreme Court philosophy since
1930. One wonders if Justice Rutledge's views have gone to stay.
EUGENE V. WILEYt
t Third year student, Washington University School of Law.
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